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Abstract
Many European countries have seen a growth of populism in recent years. Extant research shows that populist parties
are increasingly successful, and that populist messages appear more frequently in the media. This raises the question to
what extent populist messages affect public opinion. The aim of this study is to assess whether populist messages fuel
political cynicism by arguing that an arrogant, selfish and complacent political elite does not listen to what ordinary peo-
ple find important. Moreover, it assesses whether populist messages affect only those already favourably predisposed
towards populist parties, or whether it affects citizens across the board. The results of a survey experiment, conducted in
the Netherlands, suggests that individuals who are exposed to populist messages are indeedmore cynical afterwards than
individuals who are exposed to a very similar, but more ‘neutrally formulated’ message. However, the effects seem to be
restricted to supporters of populist parties.
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1. Introduction
Since the 1980s, populist parties have surged in Europe.
Right-wing populist parties such as the Front National
(FN) in France and the Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) in
theNetherlands, and left-wing populist parties like Syriza
in Greece and Podemos in Spain, have been electorally
quite successful. In a number of countries, populist par-
ties have governed, either as part of a coalition govern-
ment (e.g. Austria, Greece, Finland, Italy, the Nether-
lands and Norway) or by absolute majority (e.g. Hungary
and Poland). Also outside of party politics, populism has
become more pervasive. Rooduijn (2014), for example,
has found that as a consequence of the upsurge of pop-
ulist parties, the populist message has also become in-
creasingly widespread in the media (see also Manucci
& Weber, in press; Mazzoleni, 2008). Interestingly, in
media outlets populist claims are not only made by the
politicians that are being interviewed or cited, but also
by journalists themselves (Hameleers, 2017). As a result,
some scholars have spoken about a populist ‘Zeitgeist’ in
Europe (e.g. Mudde, 2004).
While much research exists on the causes of the per-
vasiveness of populism (for an overview see Mudde &
Kaltwasser, 2017), much less is known about the con-
sequences thereof. Some scholars have argued that the
rise of populism poses a threat to liberal democracy (e.g.
Abts & Rummens, 2007; Akkerman, 2003; Kaltwasser,
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2012; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012). However, to empiri-
cally substantiate this claim, more knowledge is required
about the consequences of the rise of populism. More
particularly, we need to understand how the upsurge
in populism affects the attitudes and behaviour of citi-
zens. Our study focuses on one particular consequence,
namely whether populist messages fuel political cyni-
cism among citizens.
On the basis of cross-sectional data, Van der Brug
(2003) provides evidence for his claim that the right-wing
populist Pim Fortuyn fuelled political discontent by his
anti-elite rhetoric. In a more recent study Rooduijn, Van
der Brug and De Lange (2016) show that citizens who
switch their support to populist parties become more
discontented with politics. While these findings strongly
suggest that populist messages can fuel discontent, we
cannot know whether it is indeed the populist message
that leads to such discontent. It is important therefore to
test this causal claim in an experimental study, which is
what we do here.
Our study is not the first experiment to examine the
effects of exposure to populism. Bos, Van der Brug and
De Vreese (2013), for example, investigate how main-
stream right and radical right-wing populist politicians
are evaluated when they express messages that are pop-
ulist in nature. They find that only radical right-wing pop-
ulist politicians are positively evaluated when they ex-
press such messages. Moreover, the effect is restricted
to citizens who are already cynical about politics. Simi-
larly, Hameleers and Schmuck (2017) show that citizens
who are exposed to messages in which blame for nega-
tive developments is attributed to either the government
or immigrants become more strongly populist in their
attitudes. Yet, this effect is restricted to those that find
the source of the message credible. Both experiments
demonstrate that citizens’ attitudes are influenced by
the messages to which they are exposed, but that only
citizens with attitudes that are already in line with the
message are susceptible to be influenced. Sniderman,
Hagendoorn and Prior (2004) refer to this as a ‘galvaniz-
ing effect’.
We are not aware of experimental studies that fo-
cus on the effects of populist messages on political cyni-
cism. To further our understanding of populism’s impact,
we therefore examine the effect of exposure to populist
messages on political cynicism by means of a survey ex-
periment. In the experiment we assign participants at
random to a treatment or a control group. The partici-
pants in the first group are exposed to a text that con-
tains a populist message, whereas the participants in the
second group are exposed to a text that is highly simi-
lar in substance, but does not contain any populist mes-
sages. We assess whether individuals allocated to the
first group report higher levels of political cynicism than
individuals assigned to the second group. Moreover, we
assess to what extent the treatment effect is conditional
upon their support for populist parties.We find a clear ef-
fect of populist messages, but this effect is restricted to
supporters of populist parties. They become more cyni-
cal about politicians as a result of their exposure to the
populist message.
2. Populism and Political Cynicism
Many scholars define populism as a set of ideas in which
the good people are pitted against the evil elite (Alber-
tazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Canovan, 2004; Mudde, 2004;
Stanley, 2008). Mudde (2004, p. 543) describes pop-
ulism as ‘an ideology that considers society to be ulti-
mately separated into two homogeneous and antagonis-
tic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’,
andwhich argues that politics should be an expression of
the volonté générale (general will) of the people’. He ar-
gues that populism is not a full ideology, such as conser-
vatism, liberalism or socialism, but a ‘thin-centred’ ideol-
ogy. It does not offer an all-encompassingworldview, but
contains first and foremost ideas about the organization
of democratic decision-making processes. In line with,
for example, Canovan (2004), Hawkins (2010), Mudde
(2004), and Taggart (2000), we conceptualize populism
as a set of ideas, which consists of two related elements:
1) a negative portrayal of ‘elites’; and 2) a glorification
of ‘the people’. A message should contain both elements
in relation to each other to be qualified as populist. This
conceptualization is both moralistic and antagonistic. Ac-
cording toMüller (2016, pp. 19–20), populism is ‘a partic-
ular moralistic imagination of politics, a way of perceiv-
ing the political world that sets a morally pure and fully
unified…people against elites who are deemed corrupt
or in some other way morally inferior’.
According to many scholars, an important motive for
supporting populist parties is to express discontent with
the established parties. Betz (1994) argues that radical
right-wing populist voters, which he labels ‘protest vot-
ers’, cast a ballot against ‘the powers that be’, which are
held responsible for what goes wrong in society (see also
Bergh, 2004). In other words, citizens support populist
parties, because they are discontented with mainstream
politicians and political parties. Most studies into the re-
lationship between discontent and support for populist
parties are based on correlations in cross-sectional data
(e.g. Betz, 1994; Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002;
Mayer & Perrineau, 1992; Norris, 2005). The interpreta-
tion of this correlation as a causal effect has been criti-
cized. In particular Van der Brug (2003) and Rooduijn et
al. (2016) have argued that the effect also runs the other
way: the populist message fuels discontent. Rooduijn et
al. (2016) refer to this as the ‘fuelling discontent logic’. Ac-
cording to this logic citizens become more discontented
with the functioning of politics as a consequence of being
exposed to the messages of populist parties. In this pa-
per we examine whether exposure to populist messages
indeed fuels discontent.
Here wewill focus on one specific form of discontent:
political cynicism. Various scholars have demonstrated
that we should distinguish various types of political dis-
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content (Dalton, 2004; Easton, 1965; Norris, 1999). Be-
cause populist messages most often focus on the antag-
onistic relationship between political elites and ordinary
people, we assess the effects of the political message on
political cynicism—a concept that taps into voters’ dis-
content with politicians in general (see Agger, Goldstein,
& Pearl, 1961). In a recent study, Pattyn, Van Hiel, Dhont
andOnraet (2012) have shown that political cynicism can
(and should) be distinguished from related concepts like
political trust, and that it is related to voting for pop-
ulist parties.
The theoretical underpinning for the proposedmech-
anism can be found in the literature on voting behaviour,
preference formation, and media exposure. Studies of
public opinion indicate that the content of amessage has
a direct effect on the attitudes of those who are exposed
to thismessage. For instance, a growing body of research
has addressed the direct effects of media messages on
public opinion (see Brandenburg & Van Egmond, 2011).
Studies have focused, for instance, on the impact of mes-
sages on voting behaviour (Druckman & Parkin, 2005),
candidate preferences (Dalton, Beck, & Huckfeldt, 1998),
and policy preferences (Zaller, 1992, 1996). Hence, there
is ample evidence that citizens are directly influenced by
the messages they are exposed to.
If this line of reasoning is extended to exposure to
populism, it can be expected that if citizens are exposed
to the message that political elites are failing, they might
be inclined to incorporate this idea into their way of
thinking about politics and become more politically dis-
contented. This logic leads to our central expectation,
which is:
H1: Exposure to populist messages leads to higher levels
of political cynicism.
Our hypothesis is related to, but also distinct from, hy-
potheses that have been put forward in recent survey
experiments. More specifically, our study differs from
previous studies, such as Bos et al. (2013) and Hameleers
and Schmuck (2017), in the causal relationship that is
tested, as well as in the conceptualization of key terms.
We will briefly outline the main differences between
these studies and ours. Bos et al. (2013) investigate how
mainstream right and radical right-wing populist politi-
cians are evaluatedwhen they expressmessages that are
populist in nature. They find that only radical right-wing
populist politicians are positively evaluated when they
express such messages. Thus, Bos et al. (2013) look at
how populist messages affect the evaluations of the indi-
vidual politician expressing these messages. We, on the
other hand, focus on the effect of populist messages in
general on cynicism vis-à-vis politicians in general. More-
over, Bos et al. (2013) employ a different definition of
populism than the one we outlined above. Hameleers
and Schmuck (2017) show that citizens who support
populists are affected by their exposure to messages
in which either the national government or immigrants
are blamed for certain problems in society. As a result
of their exposure, these citizens become more populist
in orientation. Hence, Hameleers and Schmuck (2017)
are interested in the effect of blame attribution on pop-
ulist attitudes, and populism is the dependent variable in
their study.We, on the other hand, examine the effect of
populist messages on attitudes of cynicism, making pop-
ulism the independent variable in our study.1 Thus, while
related studies have been published, the impact of pop-
ulist messages on political cynicism has not been exam-
ined yet.
Research into the effects of messages on voting be-
haviour and attitudes conclude that not all citizens are
equally likely to be affected by their exposure. Based on
consistency theories like, for instance, Festinger’s (1957)
theory of cognitive dissonance, we argue that individuals
aim for consistency among attitudes and behaviours, and
therefore evaluate (or even select) new information that
is in line with their existing views and thereby tend to ig-
nore information that runs counter to their views. As a
consequence, we would expect to find a ‘galvanizing ef-
fect’, as Sniderman et al. (2004) called it, which means
that new messages affect particularly those who are al-
ready inclined to agree with the message. To their own
surprise, Sniderman et al. (2004) do not find evidence for
such a ‘galvanizing effect’. However, this may well be due
to ceiling effects: the groups that Sniderman et al. (2004)
study were already so negatively predisposed to immi-
grants that the experimental manipulation could not ex-
ert much effect any more.
Other studies do find evidence for a ‘galvanizing ef-
fect’. Bos et al. (2013) show that populist messagesmake
citizens more likely to support populist parties. Yet, this
effect is restricted to voters who are already cynical.
Hameleers and Schmuck (2017) find that only those citi-
zens who supported the source of the message to which
they were exposed were more likely to blame elites and
immigrants. Citizens who opposed the source became
actually less instead of more anti-establishment. In our
study, the galvanizing effect would suggest that citizens
who are already favourable to populist actors, such as
populist politicians and parties, are more likely to be-
comemore cynical than citizenswhodonot support such
actors.2 We therefore hypothesize that:
H2: The effects of the exposure to populist messages is
stronger for citizens who support populist parties than
for citizens who support non-populist parties.
1 Hameleers and Schmuck (2017) conceptualize populism in a way similar to ours, namely as a combination of glorification of ‘normal’ citizens and
denunciation of the elite.
2 Attitudes are not only affected by the messages to which individuals are exposed, but also by the source of those messages and by characteristics of
its recipients (see Olson & Zanna, 1993). In this study we keep the source of the message constant. We assess, however, to what extent the effect of
the populist message is different for audiences with diverging political preferences.
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3. Research Design
In order to test our hypothesis that exposure to pop-
ulist messages leads to more political cynicism, we con-
duct a survey experiment. More specifically, we use a
randomized post-test design in which participants read
a newspaper article created by the researchers and sub-
sequently answer questions concerning their attitudes
and behaviour. One (randomly selected) group of partic-
ipants is exposed to a newspaper article, which includes
populist messages. The other group of participants reads
an article which is highly similar in substance, but which
does not contain any populist messages. Survey experi-
ments have two advantages over other research designs.
First, we know to which messages the participants are
exposed (see Tilley & Hobolt, 2011). On the other hand,
when using non-experimental research designs, we can
ask people which newspapers they read regularly and
we can content analyse these outlets. Yet, we can never
knowwhether respondents actually read the newspaper
articles that were analysed. Secondly, because partici-
pants are randomly assigned to the experimental condi-
tions, alternative explanations for differences between
groups of participants can be ruled out. This is not pos-
sible in survey-based studies, where respondents make
their own selection of outlets.
Our survey experiment is carried out in the Nether-
lands. The Netherlands is an appropriate case, because,
in comparison with many other countries, the populist
discourse is relatively common in this country—both in
the political realm and in the mass media (Rooduijn,
2014). This is an important requirement, because in a
country where populism is not very common in the pub-
lic debate, a constructed populist article would not be
very credible as a ‘real life’ media message. Moreover,
in the Netherlands populism can be found both on the
left and the right of the political spectrum (De Lange &
Rooduijn, 2011), which makes it possible to examine the
impact of populism tout court, rather than only that of
radical right-wing populism.
Our stimulus is a (fictitious) newspaper article (cre-
ated by the researchers) about the electoral losses of
mainstream parties in the Dutch national elections of
2017. We constructed two different articles: one that
contains a populist message (experimental group) and
one that does not (control group).3 The first two para-
graphs of the newspaper articles are identical and con-
cern a description of the situation. The third paragraph
differs between the control and experimental groups and
contains the interpretation of the results by a political an-
alyst. In the text given to the treatment group this anal-
ysis includes populist messages. These are references
to ‘the establishment’, which has lost touch with ‘the
wishes of ordinary citizens’. The messages in the control
group are much more neutral in tone. The exact word-
ings of the last paragraphs of our texts can be found in
the Appendix.
Before we organized our survey experiment, we con-
ducted a pilot study. It was distributed in the Nether-
lands between August 25th and August 29th, 2014 by
means of social media (Facebook, E-mail and Twitter)
(N = 128). The newspaper article in the pilot study dis-
cussed the 2014 elections to the European Parliament,
but was in terms of the presented populist messages al-
most equal to the text presented in the Appendix. Al-
though as a result of our method of convenience sam-
pling the findings are not representative for the Dutch
population, the treatment effect turned out to be statis-
tically significant (at p < .10) and in the expected direc-
tion (results are available upon request). We therefore
proceeded with our experiment.
Our survey experiment was appended to the June
edition of the DNB Household Survey (DHS), conducted
by CentERdata at Tilburg University. This panel includes
approximately 2,000 households (from which one or
more household members take part), which are rep-
resentative of the Dutch population (see, e.g., Guiso,
Sapienza, & Zingales, 2008; Parlevliet, 2017). The survey
experiment was presented between June 5th and June
20th, 2017 to 3,035 individuals, out of which 2,381 com-
pleted the questionnaire (response rate of 78.5%).
We aimed to create two similar groups by randomly
distributing the two stimuli to the respondents. As a re-
sult of this procedure, 51% of the respondents ended
up in the experimental condition and 49% in the control
group (see Table 1). The two groups were compared on
various characteristics that may be correlated with polit-
ical cynicism, such as age, education, gender, subjective
class and religiosity.We do not find any statistically signif-
icant differences between the control and experimental
groups on these characteristics, which indicates that the
two groups are equivalent.4
To measure our dependent variable, political cyni-
cism, respondents were asked to express their agree-
ment or disagreement with eight statements: 1) politi-
cians are honest; 2) politicians are profiteers; 3) politi-
cians keep their promises; 4) politicians are corrupt;
5) politicians are reliable; 6) politicians are just smooth
talkers; 7) politicians do not understand what is going on
in society; and 8) politicians are capable of solving prob-
3 We decided to employ fictitious newspaper articles because this allowed us to fully control the messages participants were exposed to and thereby to
guarantee the internal validity of our study. However, to enhance external validity, we based the stimuli on existing newspaper articles following the
Dutch elections (see Hameleers, Bos, & De Vreese, 2017, p. 879).
4 To assess whether the respondents were aware of the experimental manipulation, we also conducted a manipulation check by asking the respondents
the following question: ‘In the commentary of the political sociologist, reference is made to a cleavage between what politicians and what ordinary
citizens find important’. A t-test (t = −1.03; df = 2356; p = 0.150) shows that the two groups differ from each other in the expected direction, but
that the differences are not statistically significant (also when distinguishing populist from non-populist voters). While our treatment did affect our
dependent variable ‘political cynicism’, we have no evidence that respondents were aware of the populist tone to which they were exposed. In the
concluding section we elaborate on the implications.
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lems in society. Respondents could answer on a 5-points
scale from ‘fully agree’ to ‘fully disagree’. We combined
these items into a scale, which ranges from 1 (not at all
cynical) to 5 (very cynical). The Cronbach’s Alpha for this
scale is 0.90, which is above the traditional cut-off point
for scale reliability.
To measure whether citizens supported a populist
party prior to participating in the experiment, we asked
them for which party they had voted in the national elec-
tions of March 15th, 2017. In line with research on pop-
ulism in the Netherlands, we subsequently coded a vote
for the Forum voor Democratie (FvD), Geen Peil, Partij
voor de Vrijheid (PVV), Socialistische Partij (SP), and Voor
Nederland (VNL) as support for a populist party (e.g. De
Lange & Rooduijn, 2011), while a vote cast for any of the
other parties that participated in the electionswas coded
as support for a non-populist party.5 Of the 2,381 par-
ticipants who completed the survey, 2,184 participants
voted in the 2017 elections. Of those voters 421 respon-
dents supported a populist party, while 1,643 respon-
dents supported a non-populist party.
Table 1 lists the descriptive statistics of the variables
for the entire group of respondents. Political cynicism
is our dependent index variable and ranges from 1 (not
at all cynical) to 5 (very cynical). Populist message is a
dummy variable taking the value of 1 when respondents
have been ‘treated’ with the populist message and tak-
ing the value of 0 when respondents have received the
neutral message. Populist vote is a dummy variable for
respondents who voted, where 1 indicates they voted
for one of the populist partiesmentioned above. The last
four rows show the four combinations of having received
the populist or the neutral message and having voted
for a mainstream or a populist party. The means repre-
sent the proportion of respondents in the four groups.
Since fewer respondents voted for a populist than for a
mainstream party the two conditions with populist vot-
ers both contain 10% of the respondents, while the other
two both contain roughly 39% and 41%.
4. Results
Our main expectation is that those who have been ex-
posed to the text containing populistmessageswill be on
averagemore cynical than thosewho have been exposed
to the neutral text (H1). In Table 2 we assess whether
the mean political cynicism scores are different for the
control and experimental groups. We conduct an inde-
pendent samples t-test for which we assume equal vari-
ances, since Levene’s test indicates that the hypothesis
that the variances in the two groups are equal cannot
be rejected. Participants that have not been exposed to
the populist messages have an average cynicism score
of 3.10, whereas participants that have been exposed
to the populist messages have an average score of 3.14.
This leads to amean difference score of 0.04, which is sig-
nificant at p < .10 (one-tailed). Hence, those who have
been exposed to the populist messages score, on aver-
age, higher on the scale of political cynicism than those
who have not been exposed to such messages.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics.
Count mean sd min max
Political cynicism 2,360 3.12 0.68 1.1 5
Populist message (1 = yes) 2,381 0.51 0.50 0 1
Populist vote (1 = yes) 2,064 0.20 0.40 0 1
Populist message + populist vote 2,064 0.10 0.30 0 1
Populist message + non-populist vote 2,064 0.41 0.49 0 1
Neutral message + populist vote 2,064 0.10 0.30 0 1
Neutral message + non-populist vote 2,064 0.39 0.49 0 1
N 2,381
Table 2. Scores on scale of political cynicism.
Political cynicism
Mean Standard Error N
Without populist message −3.10 0.02 1,151
With populist message −3.14 0.02 1,209
Combined −3.12 0.01 2,360
Difference −0.04 ̂ 0.03
Note: Political cynicism is measured on a scale from 1–5, where 1 = not at all cynical, and 5 = very cynical
** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; ̂p < 0.10
5 As an alternative operationalization, we also included the elderly party 50+ in the group of populist parties. The analyses with this alternative opera-
tionalization yield largely identical findings and do not alter our conclusions.
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Our findings demonstrate an effect of the populist
message on participants’ level of cynicism, be it only sig-
nificant at the p < .10 level. The difference of 0.04 on
a 5-point scale is obviously small. However, it is impor-
tant to keep in mind that we only manipulated the word-
ing of two sentences in a newspaper article. It would be
unrealistic therefore to expect much larger differences
between the two groups and in reality citizens are much
more frequently exposed to populist statements.Wewill
discuss this further in the concluding section.
We also tested whether the supporters of populist
parties were more strongly affected by their exposure to
the populist message than the supporters of other par-
ties (H2). Table 3 presents the results of a multiple re-
gression, which demonstrates that this effect is indeed
stronger for the supporters of populist parties. In fact,
the effect is only present for the supporters of populist
parties (b = .181; p = .008); the supporters of other par-
ties are not significantly more likely to be cynical after
being exposed to the manipulated message than when
being exposed to a more ‘neutral’ message.
Figure 1 presents these results graphically. The solid
line shows the two conditions in which respondents
were exposed to a neutrally worded newspaper article,
while the dotted line shows the conditions in which re-
spondents were exposed to populist messages. It shows
that the level of cynicism is already considerably higher
among populist voters than among non-populist voters,
also when they are exposed to a neutral message (com-
pare the two groups on the straight line). Yet, the dotted
line is steeper, and the difference between the groups
Table 3. Effects on political cynicism: Interaction be-
tween exposure and support for populist parties.
Model 1
Populist message .029
(.031)
Populist vote .601**
(.048)
Populist message * Populist vote .181**
(.068)
Constant 2.923
(.022)
R2 .171
N 2,057
Note: Political cynicism is measured on a scale from 1–5, where
1 = not at all cynical, and 5 = very cynical
** p < 0.01;* p < 0.05; ̂p < 0.10
being exposed to a populist text and those being exposed
to a neutral text is only significant among populist party
voters (at the right hand side of the graph). Among main-
stream party voters the experimental treatment did not
exert a significant effect (see the left hand side of the
graph. Thus, after exposure to populist messages the gap
between the two groups of voters in terms of their level
of cynicism is larger than prior to their exposure. This
could point towards a spiral of cynicism among the sup-
porters of populist parties.6
2.8
3
3.2
3.4
3.6
3.8
0 1
Populist vote
Figure 1. Predicted values of political cynicism for supporters of populist (1) and non-populist parties (0), and those who
are exposed to a populist message (dotted line) and non-populist message (solid line).
6 We have also looked at the effects of our experimental treatment on other subgroups. First of all, we distinguished voters for the left-wing populist
SP and the various right-wing populist parties. While the effect was somewhat weaker among SP voters, the effect was not significantly different from
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5. Conclusion
There is a general concern that populism is not only a
corrective, but also a challenge to liberal democracy (e.g.
Abts & Rummens, 2007; Akkerman, 2003; Kaltwasser,
2012; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012). In this study we in-
vestigate whether the pervasiveness of populism threat-
ens liberal democracy by affecting citizens’ attitudes in a
negative way. To this end we examine the ‘fuelling dis-
content logic’, which argues that exposure to populist
messages fuels cynicism about politics (Rooduijn et al.,
2016; Van der Brug, 2003). After all, according to populist
actors—such as populist politicians, parties, andmedia—
established politicians have no idea what ordinary peo-
ple find important and only focus on their own inter-
ests. Moreover, they point towards a failure of repre-
sentation and representative institutions, such as parties
and parliaments.
Based on a survey experiment, in which we have ran-
domly assigned participants to two different groups—
one group in which individuals have been exposed to a
text containing populist messages and another group in
which individuals have been exposed to a neutral text—
we conclude that exposure to populist messages indeed
fuels political cynicism. Yet, the main effect is small, and
marginally significant at the most, given the p-value of
0.091. When we distinguished respondents according to
their support for parties, it becomes clear, however, that
the effect takes place only among supporters of populist
parties. The effect in this group is highly significant (at
p < .01), while no effect was observed among the vot-
ers for other parties. We may thus conclude that voters
for populist parties becomemore politically cynical when
being exposed to populist messages, while other voters
are not affected.
What does thismean?On the one hand, this suggests
that the persuasiveness of the populist message should
not be overestimated. We asked respondents to report
their levels of political cynicism directly after we exposed
them to a treatment. And even immediately after the
treatment the effect is limited. It might therefore well
be the case that the effect quickly disappears when time
passes by. On the other hand, our study shows that even
a small manipulation of two ‘populist worded’ sentences
in a newspaper article do affect attitudes about politics.
It thus seems plausible that continued exposure to pop-
ulist messages brings about more cynicism.
One limitation of our study is that we focus on an
effect of one small manipulation of a text. Our manip-
ulation check suggests that the respondents did not re-
alize that these messages are populist. This could mean
that other differences between the texts presented to
the experimental and control group produced the differ-
ences in political cynicism, but given the slight manipula-
tion and the large similarities between the two texts, we
find that implausible. A more plausible reason could be
that populist messages have become so pervasive that
many citizens do not even notice them anymore. That
such messages nonetheless exert an effect on political
cynicism is therefore an important finding.
Another limitation of our study is that we look at
short-term effects only (of a change in the wording of
two sentences). However, in real life citizens are continu-
ously exposed tomany populist messages. In future stud-
ies researchers may wish to focus on long-term effects
of repeated exposure to populist messages. Yet, it may
not be feasible to study this in a controlled experiment.
Another obvious limitation of our study is that we have
assessed the effect of populist messages in only one spe-
cific country—the Netherlands. We have no theoretical
reasons to expect the effects to be different in other na-
tional contexts, but whether our findings can indeed be
replicated in other contexts remains to be shown empir-
ically. Finally, respondents with anti-elite attitudes may
also feel negatively disposed to academics who conduct
this type of research. However, if this would have caused
those who are most susceptible to the populist message
to opt out of the study, our findings are likely to err on
the conservative side.
Our findings contribute to the relatively young liter-
ature on the societal and political consequences of the
rise of populism. These studies indicate that populism is
spreading through a series of mechanisms of ‘contami-
nation’. The success of populist parties impacts onmedia
populism, while the pervasiveness of populism in politics
and media in turn affects the attitudes of specific groups
of citizens. As a result of their exposure to populist mes-
sages, citizens’ political cynicism becomes stronger. How-
ever, this ‘spiral of discontent’ is only present among
those voters who were already supportive of populist
parties to begin with. Because of their tendency to select
and evaluate information on the basis of their already ex-
isting convictions, they becomemore discontentedwhen
their beliefs about the failures of politics are confirmed.
Hence, we might be witnessing a vicious cycle of dis-
content among certain groups of citizens, which might
erode their support for liberal democracy in the long run.
The consequence is a further polarization of attitudes to-
wards politicians.
A certain level of scepticism towards politicians is
essential for a democracy to function well, so we do
not want our conclusion to sound too ‘alarmist’. As long
as cynicism is directed at politicians, rather than at the
democratic system as such, this is perfectly compatible
the effect among right-wing populist party voters. We also looked at the difference between voters and non-voters. The experimental treatment had a
weaker effect among the non-voters than among voters. Yet here also, the difference was not significant. In both cases we were looking at rather small
subgroups of our sample. So, the failure to reject the null-hypothesis could be the result of the small N, which is why we do not report the results of
these tests in detail. They are available upon request.
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with a healthy democracy. However, there is always a
risk of spill-over effects (Easton, 1965), where an erosion
of specific support leads to decreases in diffuse support.
This would bemuchmore harmful to democratic support
and legitimacy.
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Appendix
The first two paragraphs of the text in the survey experiment concern the results of the elections to the national parlia-
ment in the Netherlands in March 2017. The third (and last) paragraph in both texts contains an analysis of a political
commentator. In the first text populist messages are included in the analysis, in the second text the analysis is neutral.
Text 1 (does include populist messages)
“According to political sociologist Matthijs Rooduijn this development sends an important message. ‘The gains made by
parties such as UKIP and Front National clearly show that the establishment has no idea of what the man in the street
finds important. The voter has the feeling that established parties barely take into account what ordinary citizens want’.
According to Rooduijn, the establishment could win its lost seats back if it would listen better to hardworking citizens”.
Text 2 (does not include populist messages)
“According to political sociologist Matthijs Rooduijn this development sends an important message. ‘The gains made by
parties such as UKIP and Front National clearly show that the message of these parties appeals to a large share of the
electorate. A substantial number of voters believe that parties do not offer proper solutions to important social problems’.
According to Rooduijn, parties could win their lost seats back if they took more account the ideas of their own grassroots”.
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